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Wittgenstein, the Criticism of
Philosophy, and Self-Knowledge
Tarek R. Dika
In philosophy we do not draw conclusions. “But it
must be like this!” is not a philosophical
proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone
admits.
Philosophical Investigations, § 599
Being unable – when we surrender ourselves to
philosophical thought – to help saying such-and-
such; being irresistably inclined to say it – does not
mean being forced into an assumption, or having an
immediate perception or knowledge of a state of
affairs.
Philosophical Investigations, § 299
Make some arbitrary doodle on a bit of paper. –
And now make a copy next to it, let yourself be
guided by it. – I should like to say: “Sure enough, I
was guided here. But as for what was characteristic
in what happened – if I say what happened, I no
longer find it characteristic.”
But now notice this: while I am being guided
everything is quite simple, I notice nothing special;
but afterwards, when I ask myself what it was that
happened, it seems to have been something
indescribable. Afterwards no description satisfies
me. It’s as if I couldn’t believe that I merely looked,
made such-and-such a face, and drew a line. – But
don’t I remember anything else? No; and yet I feel
as if there must have been something else; in
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particular when I say “guidance,” “influence,” and
other such words to myself. “For surely,” I tell
myself, “I was being guided.” Only then does the
idea of that ethereal, intangible influence arise.
Philosophical Investigations, § 175
Each morning you have to break through the dead
rubble afresh so as to reach the living warm seed.
Culture and Value
1 In Philosophical Investigations § 89, Wittgenstein remarks that:
[…] it is, rather, of the essence of our investigation that we do not seek to learn
anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain view.
For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand. Augustine says in the
Confessions  “quid  est  ergo  tempus?  si  nemo  ex  me  quaerat  scio;  si  quarenti
explicare,  nescio.”  –  This  could not  be  said  about  a  question of  natural  science
(“What is the specific gravity of hydrogen?” for instance). Something that we know
when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account
of  it,  is  something  that  we  need  to  remind  ourselves  of.  (And  it  is  obviously
something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself of).1
2 Something we all know when no one asks us is something I can be said to know so long as
I do not ask myself. That I might seem no longer to know what I thought I once knew does
not mean that I do not know; it means, rather, that my concept of what it means to know
something, together with my understanding of the question posed, leads me in a certain
direction. The question does not “in itself” dictate the course of this direction, for how I
understand the content of the question is not a function of the question itself. It is a
function of my concept of what it means to know something, for it is this concept that
determines the form of account I take the question to require. The various possible forms
of account determine the various possibilities of direction and understanding. Thus, from
the fact that a certain direction might lead me to think that I do not know, it does not
necessarily follow that I do not know.
3 Wittgenstein is  drawing our  attention to  a  difficulty,  a  philosophical  predicament  of
mind. It is not the fact that Augustine does not know, but rather the sense that he does
not know, that most interests Wittgenstein, its source. With Augustine, reasons have not
come to an end, rather they have not yet so much as begun, and it is not at all clear where
he might go about looking for them. Wittgenstein takes this to be an indication of what
the difficulty of philosophical investigation might be said to consist in.
4 Philosophy has always been understood as the accounting-for of what is. The sense that I
might not know what I thought I could not have failed to know need not be understood to
emerge on the basis of a fact – the fact that I do not know – for if the form of account I
take the question to require is itself misguided, the absence of an account becomes a
function of the misguided form itself, not the absence of knowledge. I might then return
to the question without hearing in it the form of account I once thought it to require. Let
us return to the passage from the Confessions:
What is time? Who can explain this easily and briefly? Who can comprehend this
even in thought so as to articulate the answer in words? Yet what do we speak of, in
our familiar everyday conversation, more than of time? We surely know what we
mean when we speak of it. We also know what is meant when we hear someone else
talking about it. What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know. If I want
to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know.2
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5 The final sentence expresses the peculiar predicament of mind that is brought about, not
by an ordinary question (e.g., “What time is it?”), but rather by a uniquely philosophical
question (“What is time?”), a question regarding the nature or essence of time as such
and in general. What happens in the space of this question is a matter that merits patient
reflection, for our understanding of a philosophical question regarding the nature of a
certain  phenomenon  determines  our  subsequent  understanding  of  the  phenomenon
itself, and this affects the kinds of things we are inclined to philosophically claim with
respect to the phenomenon in question. This relation between the form of account we
take a philosophical question to require and the kinds of things we are inclined to claim
with respect to the phenomenon in question can be described.
6 In order to set up the required contrast between ordinary discourse and the requirements
of  philosophy,  Augustine  recalls  to  mind  the  fact  that  “in  our  familiar  everyday
conversation” we speak of nothing more than time, and that we “surely know what we
mean when we speak of it.” Time is not the explicit theme of our familiar, everyday
conversation, rather it constitutes the non-thematized “horizon” of our discourse insofar
as  that  discourse  is  and  cannot  but  be,  from  a  grammatical  standpoint,  temporally
inflected.  Thus,  it  is  only  insofar  as  time  remains  buried  in  “our  familiar  everyday
conversation” that “we surely know what we mean when we speak of it.” Once it gets
“lifted” from out of this dimension and “taken up” as the thematic object of a general
philosophical account, the sense that we know what we mean when we speak of it seems
to elude us, and this marks the emergence of a kind of conflict between our familiar
discourse and our philosophical requirement. I should like to trace the origin and genesis
of this sense of conflict.
7 Once a phenomenon becomes the object of a philosophical account, our understanding
comportment toward this phenomenon undergoes a certain modification. I describe this
modification  in  terms  of  a  shift  from phenomenon to  object,  that  is,  from the  pre-
theoretical  absorption  in  the  phenomenon  to  the  theoretical  determination  of  the
phenomenon qua thematic object of  a form of philosophical  account as it  enters the
philosophical  claim-context.  This  distinction  between  phenomenon  and  object  is
Heideggerean in spirit,  if  not in letter,  and in it lies the secret to understanding the
genesis and structure of the objects of philosophical reflection and their relation to our
pre-theoretical understanding of the relevant phenomena (see §II).
8 That the sense of conflict produced in the course of philosophical reflection on the form
of  account  required  by  the  philosophical  question  gets  interpreted  as  a  kind  of
intellectual lack is itself something that should be taken into consideration as itself a
function of the form of account required by the question, not the present state of our
knowledge.  What we lack is not knowledge, but understanding. For Wittgenstein,  the
problem is  not  that  there  exists  a  genuine  absence  of  knowledge,  for  as  far  as  the
materials required for responding to philosophical questions are concerned, we already
know everything we need to know.
9 In what sense, then, do we already know everything we need to know? This is certainly
not self-evident; it even seems to contradict all our intuitions regarding the nature of the
philosophical enterprise. We have already indicated the extent to which these intuitions
are themselves the product of a certain kind of understanding of the form of account a
philosophical question is taken to require. Our question could thus be posed as follows:
how does it so much as come about that we feel ourselves to lack knowledge? This sounds
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odd: we do not tend to understand the sense that we lack knowledge to be something that
comes about as the result of something else, but rather as the default situation or pre-
given background against which all philosophical inquiry takes place and from which it
seeks to free itself. For Wittgenstein, however, this sense of lack is itself constituted – it
belongs much more of the order of accomplishment than to the order of the merely
given.  We  might  say  that  it  has  certain  conditions  of  possibility,  and  that  these
conditions,  once described,  allow us  to  actually  see  how the sense of  lack is  in  fact
accomplished. The difficulty encountered in articulating or expressing our knowledge
might  then  be  understood  to  simulate  a  gap  in  our  knowledge  only  under  certain
conditions,  and  the  description  of  these  conditions  casts  light  on  the  fact  that  this
difficulty expresses something anterior to the order of  mere ignorance.  We can only
sense that we lack knowledge of a phenomenon on the basis of a certain conception of
what we think knowing that phenomenon “must be” in order to be knowledge of that
phenomenon at all.
10 That one might understand the sense of intellectual lack to be an indication of ignorance
is  itself  a  precondition to a  certain form of  philosophical  questioning,  a  form which
presupposes a certain interpretation of the difficulty it  seeks,  through philosophy, to
surmount, and which, as such, it neither explicitly avows nor defends, which it takes as a
matter of course. An entire philosophical Weltanschaung is condensed into this silent,
unavowed gesture. That one might interpret this difficulty as a gap in our knowledge
means that one is committed to the notion that it must be filled by something other than
what we already know.
11 None of what we have said so far does full justice to Wittgenstein’s remark on Augustine.
Wittgenstein is pointing to a difficulty involved in reminding ourselves of what is already
in  plain  view.  What  we  want  to  understand are  the  conditions  under  which  such a
difficulty is possible, for there is clearly a sense in which what is already in plain view is
not visible to us. Something, then, must be obscuring our vision.
⁂
12 In Philosophical Investigations § 109, Wittgenstein reminds us that our investigation “gets
its light from the philosophical problems.” Understanding what this does and does not
mean requires some meditation, for we do not as yet understand in anything other than
an  intuitive  sense  what  Wittgenstein  takes  a  “philosophical  problem”  to  be,  how
“philosophical  problems” come about,  why our investigation is  said to “get its light”
there  from,  nor  yet  what  the  relation  between  “philosophical  problems”  and  the
difficulty  involved  in  reminding  ourselves  of  what  is  “in  plain  view”  consists  in,
supposing there to be a relation at all. And it is only by coming to greater clarity about
these questions that we might be in a position to understand why it can be so difficult to
remind ourselves of what is already in plain view.
13 The key to understanding what Wittgenstein might mean by “philosophical problem” lies
in understanding the source of the philosophical anxieties expressed by his interlocutor
throughout  Philosophical  Investigations.  In  §§ 156-171,  Wittgenstein  turns  to  a  brief
description of the use of the word “reading” in our language in order to clarify his earlier
remarks  on  understanding.  Wittgenstein’s  interlocutor  insists  that  the  criterion  for
(whether someone is) “reading” is to be found in the mental process that accompanies
the actual “act” of reading; that that is what reading is. Wittgenstein proceeds to consider
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a series of cases, reminding his interlocutor of the things he already knows: viz., that the
criteria for the application of this word are different under different circumstances, that
there is no one thing we call  “reading” (§ 156),  that different modes of reading (e.g.,
reading printed words off a page, listening to morse code, feeling along the surface of
braille) do not on the face of it appear to exhibit the “same mental process” (supposing
there to be criteria for identity here), and yet are each instances of “reading” (§ 167), that
the alleged “characteristic sensations” of reading may be present (this often happens in
dreams,  for  example),  and  nevertheless  not  yield  an  instance  of  reading  (§ 160).
Wittgenstein concludes that there is no sense in searching for the criterion for this word
in a special sort of mental process that may or may not accompany the actual act of
reading, for there is no single “act” that is (what we call) “reading” – the lesson to be
learned here is not simply that our words have a variety of uses in a variety of contexts
(the  usual  platitude about  “family  resemblances”),  but  that  they do not  permit  (i.e.,
cannot be made the objects of) a certain form of philosophical account: Wittgenstein is
drawing our attention not only to the complex life of our language, but to how certain
forms of philosophical account can affect our understanding of that life.
14 “But surely – we should like to say – reading is a quite particular process!” (§ 165). Here,
Wittgenstein’s interlocutor is expressing a requirement: reading “must be” a particular
process in order to be “reading” at all – for something rather definite takes place here,
something that must underlie all our acts of reading, something that is perhaps not yet
well understood by us, but might be better understood in the future as a problem for
natural  science  or  philosophical  psychology  (§ 158).  Here,  Wittgenstein’s  interlocutor
expresses the sense of intellectual lack the origin and genesis of which we have already
attempted to trace in broad outline.
15 What he refuses to accept – what he needs to be reminded of – is “what we should say
when” we talk about a certain phenomenon (here, “reading”), for only then can he open
himself to the fact that, despite the pretensions of our educated, scientific culture, the
criteria  for  our  words  do  not  in  the  first  place  derive  from  the  place  a  possible
philosophical psychology or natural science might go about looking for them; they are
not the kind of thing psychology, be it mentalist or materialist, requires them to be in
order to be the proper objects  of  psychological  research:  our  words do not  fit  their
paradigm or form of philosophical or scientific object.
16 What, then, is the source of this anxiety? Wittgenstein’s interlocutor is dismayed at the
conflict  between his  requirement,  which  anticipates  the  form of  his  object,  and  the
pretheoretical modes of the phenomenon as these modes are expressed in our language.
His  requirement  has  misled  him into  searching for  the  phenomenon there  where  it
cannot be, overlooking it, meanwhile, there where it already is. We are now in a better
position to appreciate the way in which the sense of intellectual lack is in fact constituted
by the form of account our understanding takes a philosophical question to require.
17 Our requirement gives rise to a form of conflict,  for our language does not “fit” our
requirement. This form raises significant questions regarding the relation between
philosophical requirement, the possibility of the objects of philosophical reflection, and
the generation of philosophical problems. Our requirement institutes contraints on what
the phenomenon under consideration “must be” in order to be the phenomenon that it is;
it  constrains us to see the matter in a certain way. It  “mediates” our relation to the
phenomenon, furnishes the prism through which the phenomenon is seen, understood.
Our understanding of  the phenomenon becomes a function of  our requirement.  This
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suggests that the objects of philosophical reflection are not simply given. The objects of
philosophical  reflection  might  then  be  understood  as  the  constituted  products  or
accomplishments of the specific philosophical requirements “mediating” our relation to
the  phenomena  under  consideration.  The  objects  of  philosophical  reflection  are
constituted in accordance with our requirements, and should our requirements require
something of the phenomenon that contradicts the facts of language, a conflict emerges:
our language resists our requirement, does not furnish the proper form of object. The
transition from our pre-theoretical understanding of a particular phenomenon to the
theoretically determined understanding of that phenomenon cannot in this case be made
without generating a conflict between the phenomenon and the object of philosophical or
theoretical reflection. Understanding philosophical requirement means understanding,
not only its role with respect to the entering of concrete claims, but, and perhaps more
importantly,  understanding its role with respect to the constitution of the objects of
those claims.  In this  case,  “assembling reminders” has the force of  undermining the
paradigm of object specific to philosophical psychology as constituted by the institutive
requirement of that science.
18 Our language denies us our requirements, and our requirements render us blind to the
facts of our language. Our requirements, then, obscure our vision, prevent us from seeing
what is in plain view, for what is in plain view, what we cannot have failed to know, does
not  conform,  or  only imperfectly  conforms,  to  our requirement,  and thus cannot  be
pertinent to us, since “pertinence” has itself become a function of our requirement. What
enters our field of vision in philosophy is not and must not be taken to be the undisturbed
calm of the phenomena of our world, but our world as seen through a prism the form of
which oftentimes forces upon us a certain blindness with respect to the facts of  our
language. What does and does not enter our field of vision when we are doing philosophy
must  itself  become  a  problem  for  philosophy,  for  that  the  objects  of  philosophical
reflection might be the constituted products of the requirements guiding that reflection,
bearing  little  or  no  resemblance  to  the  phenomena  reflected  upon,  means  that  the
significance of philosophy might be lost on us.
19 Every genuine philosophical requirement has the force of something not chosen, some-
thing demanded by the phenomena themselves, something philosophers have a special
ear for. But phenomena do not demand anything, they rest in silence. We are ourselves
the elsewhere that we hear. And yet we do not have complete control over what, within
us, compels us, nor do we always recognize ourselves to be thinking at the behest of a
requirement.  What appears to be a necessary state of  affairs  can be recognized as a
requirement only after another path of thinking has been laid down. This other path
opens us onto an hitherto unheard of  possibility of thinking,  a possibility that takes
responsibility  for  the  requirement  and  makes  of  it  an  object  of  criticism.  The
requirements  that  have  emerged  in  the  course  of  the  history  of  philosophy  –
metaphysical, epistemological, logical, ethical – are so deeply our own that they have
oftentimes appeared to possess a necessity wholly independent of all human being. We
project our requirements onto the phenomena themselves and proceed to investigate
them on that basis.
20 The “moral perfection” of thought consists,  then, in occasioning within ourselves the
disposition to understand things not beyond but,  as it were,  before  our requirements
determine the field of thinking, and this despite an urge to misunderstand, despite the
force  of  our  requirements.3 Requirements  compel  conviction,  they exercise  a  certain
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power, they haunt us, and our wanting to avail ourselves of them and their effects in no
way secures us against their imminent return. To question a requirement is to take on the
enormous task of rearrangement for the sake of undoing, within the space rearranged,
the conviction that  requirement compels.  But  the life  of  words is  stubborn,  and our
attempts at leading them back does not guarantee that they will stay for any longer than
a night. There is always the morning drift, the hold of a requirement, the return of the
must, and the daily labor of breaking free.
NOTES
1. Wittgenstein L.,  (1953),  Philosophical  Investigations,  trans.  G. E. M. Anscombe,  New York,  The
Macmillan Company, § 89.
2. St. Augustine, (1998), Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 230.
3. Wittgenstein L.,  (1953),  Philosophical  Investigations,  trans.  G. E. M. Anscombe,  New York,  The
Macmillan Company, 190: “Don’t look at it as a matter of course, but as the most remarkable
thing, that verbs like ‘believe,’ ‘wish,’ ‘will’ display all the inflexions possessed by ‘cut,’ ‘chew,’
‘run’.”
ABSTRACTS
The Philosophical  Investigations  can  be  read  as  a  sustained  meditation  on the  metaphysical
effects  philosophical  requirements  have  on  our  understanding  of  the  phenomena  of
philosophical inquiry. The present essay proposes the basic outlines such a reading might take by
attending to Wittgenstein’s distinctive form of philosophical criticism, a form that interrogates
the theoretical and moral integrity of our requirements and the claims we enter on their behalf.
On this reading, the moral perfection of thought can be said to consist in the criticism of the
requirements  that  emerge  in  the  course  of  philosophical  inquiry  or,  in  Kantian  terms,  the
critique of the dialectical requirements of reason.
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